Type: atom
Encoding: UTF-8
Title: Light Blue Touchpaper
Link: http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org
Description:
Creator: 

****************************************
Item: (In)security at the University of Birmingham
<http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2007/02/25/insecurity-at-the-university-of-birmingham/>
Date: 2007-02-25 15:15:34 UTC
I travelled to the University of Birmingham[1] on Friday to give a guest 
lecture to their undergraduates on Anonymity and Traceability[2]. It was 
given in a smart new lecture theatre, which had what Birmingham 
apparently call a lectern PC[3] at the front with buttons to give the 
speaker control of the room’s AV devices and lighting, along with a 
proper PC running various Windows applications, so you can plug in your 
USB flash drive[4] and display your material.

As you can see from the photo, they have a rather trivial security model 
for using this PC:

[A][5]

The text (apologies for a rather fuzzy photo) says: "Username=user" and 
"Password=user&2006".

With a little thought, it can be seen that most likely this isn’t really 
a security issue at all, but a software design issue. I rather suspect 
that there just isn’t a way of turning off the login function, and the 
PC can’t be used to access any other important systems — and no-one 
wants to see lectures delayed if the password isn’t to hand. That’s 
undoubtedly why they’ve used proper Dymo[6]-style tape for the 
information, rather than relying on the traditional[7] yellow sticky[8], 
which could get lost!

[1] http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/
[2] http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rnc1/talks/070223-anontrace.pdf
[3] http://www.is.bham.ac.uk/lrat/lecternsoftware.htm
[4] http://www.usbflashdrive.org/
[5] 
http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/wp-content/uploads/2007/02/birmingham-lectern-pc.jpg
[6] http://global.dymo.com/enGB/Products/LabelMANAGER_150.html
[7] 
http://www.computerworld.com/securitytopics/security/story/0,10801,61986,00.html
[8] http://www.3m.com/us/office/postit/pastpresent/history_ws.html

[A] 
http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/wp-content/uploads/2007/02/birmingham-lectern-pc.jpg

Feed: Light Blue Touchpaper
<http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org>
Author: Richard Clayton
****************************************
Item: SOCA: we just want your money?
<http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2007/02/11/soca-we-just-want-your-money/>
Date: 2007-02-11 16:56:09 UTC
Just over a year ago I wrote about the, then upcoming, Serious Organised 
Crime Agency (SOCA), reporting that their aim in tackling “level 3″ 
crime was to be “mysterious and menacing[1]“. I pointed out how they 
were going to be absorbing the National High Tech Crime Unit (NHTCU) and 
that this would leave a large gap, in that there would apparently be no 
police organisation dealing with “level 2″ eCrime — crime which is not 
local to a single police force area, but that is not sufficiently 
serious or organised to be dealt with by SOCA.

In fact, I’ve since learnt that the inability to deal with level 2 
criminality is not just an eCrime issue. In 2005 Her Majesty’s 
Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) published “Closing the Gap - Review 
of the ‘Fitness for Purpose’ of the Current Structure of Policing in 
England and Wales[2]“, which found that the failure to deal with “level 
2″ criminality was an issue across a very wide range of different crimes 
(the whole report makes its points without once mentioning eCrime or the 
Internet). This led to the, now abandoned[3], proposals to compulsorily 
merge 43 police forces into 17 larger units. No further generic policy 
initiative appears to be forthcoming.

However, as I wrote in October, there is some thought going into eCrime 
and the current proposal is “mainstreaming[4]“, viz: not treating it as 
anything special.

Additionally, the Met Police have been floating the idea of an national 
coordination centre for eCrime reports, as hinted at in this January 
2007 Met eCrime progress report[5] to the Metropolitan Police Authority. 
Current indications are that the Home Office may have problems coming up 
with the money[6] to fund the centre, although SCDEA e-Crime[7], the 
equivalent unit in Scotland, is funded by the Scottish Executive. 
Perhaps more about progress south of the border will come to light in 
March, when Commander Sue Wilkinson[8], the Association of Chief Police 
Officers (ACPO) lead on eCrime testifies before a House of Lords Select 
Committee[9].

But, I’m digressing, so back to SOCA[10]…

Last month I, and a couple of other eCrime policy opinion formers (!), 
were invited down to Docklands for the proverbial “free lunch” and 
several hours of presentations on what SOCA is doing about “level 3″ 
criminality. It’s a little tricky to report on the detail, because they 
asked us to treat some of the material in confidence. However, two clear 
messages stood out:

The first is that the absorbed NHTCU is now significantly bigger, 
significantly better resourced, and with the hiving off of “child abuse 
image” issues to CEOP[11], is not being forever distracted into chasing 
down individual paedophiles (if there’s one child at risk, or an 
420-million dollar bank hack[12] to investigate, the former tended to 
get all the resource). This is basically a Good Thing, so far as it 
goes.

The second message is that SOCA is a “harm reduction agency” and is not 
just concentrating on detective work and prosecutions. They are also 
looking at a whole range of other interventions, from offender 
management (serious, organised criminals have a very high recidivism 
rate) through diligent application of the Proceeds of Crime[13] 
legislation, to working with industry to harden systems against criminal 
opportunities.

They have a Bill before parliament at present (the Serious Crime 
Bill[14]) which will give them sweeping new powers to create 
“gangster-ASBOs” to restrict the lives of convicted organised criminals, 
and will permit the wholesale swapping of data for the prevention of 
fraud, without infringement of the Data Protection Act. The Bill also 
reworks the framework for “inchoate” offences, viz: incitement to commit 
crimes or assisting with them — of which perhaps more on another 
occasion, since poor wording for the offences could make many security 
research activities problematic.

Looking back, it is this strong emphasis on SOCA’s approach to ensuring 
“crime doesn’t pay” that remains with me most strongly. This isn’t just 
the approach of locking Al Capone up for tax evasion[15] because nothing 
else could be made to stick (though Capone actually served time for 
several other offences). This is all about SOCA developing an effective 
way of stripping criminals of their ill-gotten gains.

I’m reminded of Sir Alan Sugar[16] giving a lecture about management way 
back in the 1980’s. He was mocking the catch-phrase/mission-statement 
culture, memorably saying, “‘Pan Am takes good care of you’, ‘Marks and 
Spencer loves you’, ‘Securicor cares’ . . . at Amstrad, ‘We just want 
your money’[17]“. Twenty years on, that seems a rather apt phrase for a 
significant slice of SOCA’s activities.

[1] 
http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2006/02/06/mysterious-and-menacing/
[2] 
http://inspectorates.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmic/inspect_reports1/thematic-inspections/closinggap05.pdf
[3] http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/breakfast/5331538.stm
[4] http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2006/10/13/mainstreaming-ecrime/
[5] http://www.mpa.gov.uk/committees/mpa/2007/070125/10.htm
[6] 
http://www.pcmag.co.uk/computing/analysis/2173353/tech-crime-units-lack-central
[7] http://www.sdea.police.uk/nhtcus.htm
[8] http://www.met.police.uk/scd/about/s_wilkinson.htm
[9] 
http://www.parliament.uk/parliamentary_committees/lords_s_t_select/internet.cfm
[10] http://www.soca.gov.uk/
[11] http://www.ceop.gov.uk/
[12] http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,1895,1777706,00.asp
[13] http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2002/20020029.htm
[14] 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/pabills/200607/serious_crime.htm
[15] http://www.fbi.gov/libref/historic/famcases/capone/capone.htm
[16] http://www.amstrad.com/about/sir_alan.html
[17] http://eurowards.org/content/article.php?sid=25

Feed: Light Blue Touchpaper
<http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org>
Author: Richard Clayton
****************************************
Item: Financial Ombudsman on Chip & PIN infallibility
<http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2007/02/08/financial-ombudsman-on-chip-pin-infallibility/>
Date: 2007-02-08 18:25:56 UTC
The Financial Ombudsman Service[1] offers to adjudicate disputes between 
banks and their customers who claim to have been treated unfairly. We 
were forwarded a letter written by the Ombudsman[2] concerning a 
complaint by a Halifax customer over unauthorised ATM withdrawals. I am 
not familiar with the details of this particular case, but the letter 
does give a good illustration of how the complaint procedure is stacked 
against customers.

The customer had requested further information from Halifax (the Firm) 
and the Financial Ombudsman Service (this Service) had replied:

However this Service has already been presented with the evidence you 
have requested from the Firm and I comment on it as follows. Although 
you have requested this information from the Firm yourself (and I 
consider that it is not obliged to provide it to you) I conclude that 
this will not make any difference, because this Service has already 
reviewed this information.

The right of parties in dispute to see the evidence involved is a basic 
component of justice systems, but the Financial Ombudsman has clearly 
not heard of this, but then again they are funded by the banks[3]. While 
the bank can have their own experts examine the evidence, the customer 
cannot do the same. Although the Financial Ombudsman service can review 
the evidence, giving it to the customer would allow them to pursue 
further investigation on their own.

The Firm has provided an ‘audit trail’ of the transactions disputed by 
you. This shows the location and times of the transactions any evidences 
that the card used was ‘CHIP’ read.

Without access to the audit trail and information concerning how it was 
produced, it is almost impossible for the customer to know the precise 
details of the transaction. Based solely on the letter, there are still 
a number of important unanswered questions. For example: Was the card in 
question SDA or DDA? SDA cards can be cloned[4] to produce *yes cards*, 
which will accept any PIN and still work in *offline* transactions, 
where the terminal or ATM does not contact the bank. This type of fraud 
has been seen in France[5] (pp. 5–10). Was the ATM online or offline at 
the time of the transaction? Although ATMs are generally online, if Chip 
& PIN terminals fail to dial up the bank they may continue to work 
offline and so accept SDA clones. Could this have happened with this 
ATM? What was the application cryptogram presented in this transaction? 
When a Chip & PIN card authorises a transaction, it produces an 
*application cryptogram* which allows the bank to verify that the card 
is legitimate. A yes card would not produce the correct application 
cryptogram. What is the key for the card? The application cryptogram is 
produced using a cryptographic *key* known only by the card and bank. 
With this and some other information the customer could confirm that the 
application cryptogram really came from his card. Since the card has 
long since been cancelled, releasing this key should not be a security 
risk. If the banks are not storing this information, how can they be 
sure that their systems are operating correctly?

It seems unlikely that the Financial Ombudsman knew which of these 
events have occurred either, otherwise I would have expected them to say 
so in their letter.

As we have already advised you, since the advent of CHIP and PIN, this 
Service is not aware of any incidents where a card with a ‘CHIP’ has 
been successfully cloned by fraudsters so that it could be used by them 
successfully in a cash machine.

Besides the scenarios mentioned above, our demonstration for Watchdog[6] 
showed how, even without cloning a card, a Chip & PIN terminal could be 
fooled into accepting a counterfeit. Assuming this ATM read the chip 
rather than the magnetic stripe, our attack would work just as well 
there. The situation surrounding this particular case might preclude a 
relay attack, but it is one of many possibilities that ought to be 
eliminated in a serious investigation.

Although you question The Firm’s security systems, I consider that the 
audit trail provided is in a format utilised by several major banks and 
therefore can be relied upon.

The format of the audit trail is no indication of whether the 
information it records is a true and complete representation of what 
actually happened and it is almost ludicrous to suggest that. Even if it 
were, the fact that several banks are using it is no indication of its 
security. To actually establish these facts, external scrutiny is 
required and, without access to bank’s systems, customers are not a 
position to arrange for this.

So the banking dispute resolution process works well for the banks, by 
reducing their litigation costs, but not well for their customers. If 
customers go to the Ombudsman, they risk being asked to prove their 
innocence without being given access to the information necessary to do 
so. Instead, they could go directly to the courts, but while the bank 
might accuse customers of not following proper procedures, if they win 
there they can at least send in the bailiffs[7].

[1] http://www.financial-ombudsman.org.uk/
[2] 
http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/wp-content/uploads/2007/02/ombud-redact.png
[3] 
http://www.financial-ombudsman.org.uk/publications/intro_firms/intro-firms-18.htm
[4] 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/pages/live/articles/news/news.html?in_article_id=389084&#038;in_page_id=1770&#038;in_a_source=
[5] 
http://www.clusif.asso.fr/fr/production/ouvrages/pdf/CyberCrime2001.pdf
[6] 
http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2007/02/06/chip-pin-relay-attacks/
[7] 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/pages/live/articles/news/news.html?in_article_id=430129&#038;in_page_id=1770

Feed: Light Blue Touchpaper
<http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org>
Author: Steven J. Murdoch
****************************************
Item: Chip & PIN relay attacks
<http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2007/02/06/chip-pin-relay-attacks/>
Date: 2007-02-06 09:36:58 UTC
Saar Drimer and myself have shown that the Chip & PIN system[1], used 
for card payments in the UK, is vulnerable to a new kind of fraud. By 
“relaying” information from a genuine card, a Chip & PIN terminal in 
another shop, can be made to accept a counterfeit card. We previously 
discussed this possibility in “Chip & Spin”[2] but it was not until now 
that we implemented and tested the attack.

A fraudster sets up a fake terminal[3] in a busy shop or restaurant. 
When a genuine customer inserts their card into this terminal, the 
fraudster’s accomplice, in another shop, inserts their counterfeit card 
into the merchant’s terminal. The fake terminal reads details from the 
genuine card, and relays them to the counterfeit card, so that it will 
be accepted. The PIN is recorded by the fake terminal and sent to the 
accomplice for them to enter, and they can then walk off with the goods. 
To the victim, everything was normal, but when their statement arrives, 
they will find that they have been defrauded.

[A]

From the banks’ perspective, there will be nothing unusual about this 
transaction. To them, it will seem as if the real card was used, with a 
chip and along with the correct PIN. Banks have previously claimed that 
if a fraudulent Chip & PIN transaction was placed, then the customer 
must have been negligent in protecting their card and PIN, and so must 
be liable. This work shows that despite customers taking all due care in 
using their card, they can still be the victim of fraud.

For more information, we have a summary of the technique and FAQ[4]. 
This attack will be featured on Watchdog[5], tonight (6 February) at 
19:00 GMT on BBC One. The programme will show how we successfully sent 
details between two shops in the same street, but it should work equally 
well, via mobile phone, to the other side of the world.

It is unlikely that criminals are currently using techniques such as 
this, as there are less sophisticated attacks which Chip & PIN remains 
vulnerable to. However, as security is improved, the relay attack may 
become a significant source of fraud. Therefore, it is important that 
defences against this attack are deployed sooner rather than later. We 
discuss defences in our draft academic paper[6], submitted for review at 
a peer reviewed conference.

*Update* (2007-01-10): The segment of Watchdog featuring our 
contribution has been posted to YouTube[7].

[1] http://www.chipandpin.co.uk/
[2] http://www.chipandspin.co.uk/spin.pdf
[3] 
http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2006/12/24/chip-pin-terminal-playing-tetris/
[4] http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/research/security/projects/banking/relay/
[5] http://www.bbc.co.uk/consumer/tv_and_radio/watchdog/
[6] 
http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/research/security/projects/banking/relay/bounding.pdf
[7] http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X7pjUIxKoEc

[A] 
http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/wp-content/uploads/2007/02/relay.jpg

Feed: Light Blue Touchpaper
<http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org>
Author: Steven J. Murdoch
****************************************
Item: Human Rights and Biophysics (strange similarities)
<http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2007/01/07/human-rights-and-biophysics-strange-similarities/>
Date: 2007-01-07 21:21:15 UTC
I recently received an email from “Daniel” at the “European Human Rights 
Centre”.

I came across your site while searching the net for
some quality websites. I think you did a great job
with your site.

My name is Daniel. I work for The European Human
Rights Centre (EHRC).

I would like to add your site to our usefull links page
(http://www.ehrcweb.org/links.php ) and I was
wondering if you can post a link with our site in
your website.

For your convenience I send you bellow the code
for our website:
<a href="http://www.ehrcweb.org/">EHRC</a>

If you have any questions, don't hesitate to
contact me and I'll answer your questions promtly.

We are Nonprofit organization .
Best regards,
Daniel
European Human Rights Centre Organisation
ehrcweb.org
HPM G5
ETH Honggeberg
CH-8093 Zurich / Switzerland
Tel: +41-1-638-3453
Fax: +41-1-693-10 73 and 693 11 51

But this email is not quite what it seems….

Feed: Light Blue Touchpaper
<http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org>
Author: Richard Clayton
****************************************
Item: Chip & PIN terminal playing Tetris
<http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2006/12/24/chip-pin-terminal-playing-tetris/>
Date: 2006-12-24 21:08:24 UTC
Many discussions over the security of Chip & PIN have focused on the 
tamper-resistance of terminals (for example in the aftermath of the 
Shell Chip & PIN fraud[1]). It is important to remember, however, that 
even perfect tamper resistance only ensures that the terminal will no 
longer be able to communicate with the bank once opened. It does not 
prevent anyone from replacing most of the terminal’s hardware and 
presenting it to customers as legitimate, so freely collecting card 
details and PINs.

Steven Murdoch and myself took the chassis of a real terminal and 
replaced much of the internal electronics such that it allows us to 
control the screen, keypad and card-reader. Steven suggested that in 
order to show that it is completely under our control, we should make it 
play Tetris (similarly to the guys who made a voting machine play 
chess[2]). We recorded a short video showing our Tetris playing terminal 
in action. Have a merry Christmas and happy New Year [A]

*Update* (2007-01-03): The video is now on YouTube[3].

*Update* (2007-01-05): The Association for Payment Clearing Services
(APACS) has responded[4]:

APACS, the payments organisation representing high street banks, said 
the Cambridge breakthrough could be a threat.

‘People could, in theory, use this to steal account details from cards,’ 
said Sandra Quinn of APACS. ‘Our experts are in discussion with the 
manufacturers of terminals to see what can be done. Essentially what 
these people have done is replace the innards of a chip and Pin machine.

‘However, we would say that this has only been seen in a laboratory so 
far. People would not be able to create counterfeit chip and Pin cards, 
but they could use this information abroad to make purchases.’

[1] 
http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2006/05/10/the-mythical-tamper-proof-pin-pad/
[2] http://www.wijvertrouwenstemcomputersniet.nl/other/es3b-en.pdf
[3] http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wWTzkD9M0sU
[4] 
http://www.thisismoney.co.uk/saving-and-banking/article.html?in_article_id=416139&#038;in_page_id=7&#038;ct=5

[A] 
http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/wp-includes/images/smilies/icon_smile.gif

Feed: Light Blue Touchpaper
<http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org>
Author: Saar Drimer
****************************************
Item: Health database optout - latest news
<http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2006/12/18/health-database-optout-latest-news/>
Date: 2006-12-18 10:10:58 UTC
This morning I debated health privacy on Radio 4’s Today programme with 
health minister Lord Warner. You can listen to the debate here[1], and 
there is an earlier comment by Michael Summers of the Patients’ 
Association here[2].

I support a campaign by TheBigOptOut.org[3] which has so far persuaded 
thousands of people to write to their GPs forbidding the upload of their 
patient records to central systems. Once they are uploaded, you’ll have 
to prove ’substantial mental distress’ to the government (as Lord Warner 
says) to get them removed or restricted. It is much simpler to tell your 
GP not to upload them in the first place (and you can always change your 
mind later if the Government delivers on its claims about safety and 
privacy).

For more, see TheBigOptOut.org[3], nhs-it.info[4] and my previous blog 
posts here[5], here[6] and here[7], and our work on children’s 
databases[8] (children’s safety and privacy might be particularly at 
risk from the proposals, as I explain in the debate[1]).

[1] 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/radio4/today/listenagain/ram/today4_nhs_record_20061218.ram
[2] 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/radio4/today/listenagain/ram/today2_nhs_record_20061218.ram
[3] http://www.thebigoptout.org
[4] http://www.nhs-it.info
[5] 
http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2006/12/01/health-privacy-breaking-news/
[6] 
http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2006/11/27/developments-on-health-privacy/
[7] 
http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2006/11/01/opting-out-of-the-nhs-database/
[8] http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2006/11/22/kids-databases/

Feed: Light Blue Touchpaper
<http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org>
Author: Ross Anderson
****************************************
Item: 23rd Chaos Communication Congress
<http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2006/12/12/23rd-chaos-communication-congress/>
Date: 2006-12-12 11:13:44 UTC
[A]The 23rd Chaos Communication Congress[1] will be held later this 
month in Berlin, Germany on 27–30 December. I will be attending to give 
a talk[2] on Hot or Not: Revealing Hidden Services by their Clock 
Skew[3]. Another contributor to this blog, George Danezis[4], will be 
talking on An Introduction to Traffic Analysis[5].

This will be my third time speaking at the CCC (I previously talked on 
Hidden Data in Internet Published Documents[6] and The Convergence of 
Anti-Counterfeiting and Computer Security[7] in 2004 then Covert 
channels in TCP/IP: attack and defence[8] in 2005) and I’ve always had a 
great time but this year looks to be the best yet. Here are a few 
highlights from the draft programme[9], although I am sure there are 
many great talks I have missed.

- Bernd R. Fix on A not so smart card[10] — one of the rare cases where 
key length (320 bit RSA) *was* the major weakness in a security system
- Caspar Bowden, Chief Privacy Advisor, Microsoft EMEA (and former 
director of FIPR[11]) on Transparency and Privacy[12], covering Kim 
Cameron’s 7 laws of identity[13]
- Ilja (who has an amazing ability to exploit seemingly unexploitable 
bugs) on Unusual bugs[14] and You can’t make this stuff up[15]
- Jacob Appelbaum and Ralf-Philipp Weinmann on Unlocking FileVault[16] — 
Jacob was at the CCC last year giving a summary of disk encryption 
systems; now he is back to go into more detail on the one from MacOS X
- Joanna Rutkowska, author of the Nushu TCP/IP steganography scheme[17] 
(which I discussed in my paper[18] on this topic) and the Blue Pill 
virtualization based rootkit[19], will be talking on Stealth malware — 
can good guys win?[20]
- Melanie Rieback on A Hacker’s Toolkit for RFID Emulation and 
Jamming[21] — covering the RFID Guardian[22], as featured on Schneier’s 
blog[23], Boing Boing[24] and Slashdot[25]. Melanie gave a talk on an 
early version of this project at the International Workshop on Security 
Protocols[26] so I will be interested to see how it has progressed
- Roger Dingledine (co-designer of Tor[27]) on Tor and China[28] — 
censorship resistance has been a major interest of mine, particularly 
since I started working for the OpenNet Initiative[29]
- Rop Gonggrijp on We don’t trust voting computers[30] — from the team 
who made a Dutch voting computer play chess[31]

It’s looking like a great line-up, so I hope many of you can make it. 
See you there!

[1] http://events.ccc.de/congress/2006/Home
[2] http://events.ccc.de/congress/2006/Fahrplan/events/1513.en.html
[3] 
http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2006/09/04/hot-or-not-revealing-hidden-services-by-their-clock-skew/
[4] http://homes.esat.kuleuven.be/~gdanezis/
[5] http://events.ccc.de/congress/2006/Fahrplan/events/1478.en.html
[6] http://events.ccc.de/congress/2004/fahrplan/event/271.en.html
[7] http://events.ccc.de/congress/2004/fahrplan/event/108.en.html
[8] http://events.ccc.de/congress/2005/fahrplan/events/798.en.html
[9] http://events.ccc.de/congress/2006/Fahrplan/events.en.html
[10] http://events.ccc.de/congress/2006/Fahrplan/events/1449.en.html
[11] http://www.fipr.org/
[12] http://events.ccc.de/congress/2006/Fahrplan/events/1724.en.html
[13] http://www.identityblog.com/stories/2004/12/09/thelaws.html
[14] http://events.ccc.de/congress/2006/Fahrplan/events/1456.en.html
[15] http://events.ccc.de/congress/2006/Fahrplan/events/1428.en.html
[16] http://events.ccc.de/congress/2006/Fahrplan/events/1642.en.html
[17] http://www.ccc.de/congress/2004/fahrplan/event/176.en.html
[18] http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~sjm217/papers/ih05coverttcp.pdf
[19] 
http://theinvisiblethings.blogspot.com/2006/06/introducing-blue-pill.html
[20] http://events.ccc.de/congress/2006/Fahrplan/events/1381.en.html
[21] http://events.ccc.de/congress/2006/Fahrplan/events/1597.en.html
[22] http://www.rfidguardian.org/
[23] http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2006/12/rfid_personal_f.html
[24] http://www.boingboing.net/2006/12/06/personal_firewall_fo.html
[25] http://hardware.slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=06/12/07/1355219
[26] http://homepages.feis.herts.ac.uk/~strrjh/SP2005/schedule.html
[27] http://tor.eff.org/
[28] http://events.ccc.de/congress/2006/Fahrplan/events/1444.en.html
[29] http://opennet.net/
[30] http://events.ccc.de/congress/2006/Fahrplan/events/1423.en.html
[31] http://www.heise.de/english/newsticker/news/79106

[A] 
http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/wp-content/uploads/2006/12/23c3_135x122_23c3.jpg

Feed: Light Blue Touchpaper
<http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org>
Author: Steven J. Murdoch
****************************************
Item: Health privacy … breaking news …
<http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2006/12/01/health-privacy-breaking-news/>
Date: 2006-12-01 15:29:31 UTC
The Chief Medical Officer, Sir Liam Donaldson, has written a letter[1] 
to all GPs and hospital medical directors telling them that if patients 
try to opt out of the central collection of their medical data, the 
Secretary of State must be told. This follows a campaign[2] that I’ve 
been helping and that has attracted strong support - in the press[3], 
from GPs[4] and from public opinion[5].

This letter orders GPs to break patient confidentiality - and apparently 
for the noble purpose of news management. I understand that at least one 
GP will be reporting Sir Liam to the General Medical Council. It is 
entirely up to the patient to decide whether to send an opt-out letter 
to their GP, to Ms Hewitt, or to both. It is not for a civil servant - 
even a very grand one like Sir Liam - to unilaterally override the 
wishes of those patients who decide to write to their GP but not to Ms 
Hewitt. (It’s also somewhat amusing as, only a month ago, officials were 
telling patients who tried to opt out that their GPs would decide 
whether to upload data[6].)

Developing …

[1] http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/Papers/nhs-cmolet-nov.pdf
[2] http://www.thebigoptout.org
[3] 
http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2006/11/01/opting-out-of-the-nhs-database/
[4] http://society.guardian.co.uk/e-public/story/0,,1953185,00.html
[5] http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk_news/story/0,,1960170,00.html
[6] 
http://dooooooom.blogspot.com/2006/11/nhs-data-rape-hits-headlines.html

Feed: Light Blue Touchpaper
<http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org>
Author: Ross Anderson
****************************************
Item: Developments on health privacy…
<http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2006/11/27/developments-on-health-privacy/>
Date: 2006-11-27 23:08:23 UTC
The Register[1] reports a leaked document[2] from the NHS which 
concludes that sensitive patient records would probably be safer held 
locally, rather than stored on a national database as the Government 
proposes.

This follows a poll last week in which a majority of GPs[3] said they 
would not upload their patients’ records to the national database. 
Together the poll and the leak are a double whammy for the misguided and 
wasteful project to centralise all computer systems in the NHS[4].

On Wednesday we are launching a campaign[5] to persuade patients to opt 
out too. The inaugural meeting will be from 7 to 9 PM in Imperial 
College, London[6]. For background, see recent posts on opting out[7] 
and on kids’ databases[8].

[1] http://www.theregister.co.uk/2006/11/27/care_record_conf/
[2] 
http://www.nhsconfidentiality.org/wp-content/uploads/November%20-%20NHS%20Care%20Records%20Report.pdf
[3] http://society.guardian.co.uk/e-public/story/0,,1953185,00.html
[4] http://editthis.info/nhs_it_info/Main_Page
[5] http://www.thebigoptout.org
[6] http://www.no2id.net/news/events.php#111
[7] 
http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2006/11/01/opting-out-of-the-nhs-database/
[8] http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2006/11/22/kids-databases/

Feed: Light Blue Touchpaper
<http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org>
Author: Ross Anderson
