---
layout: docs
page_title: Seal/Unseal
description: >-
  A Vault must be unsealed before it can access its data. Likewise, it can be
  sealed to lock it down.
---

# Seal/Unseal

When a Vault server is started, it starts in a _sealed_ state. In this
state, Vault is configured to know where and how to access the physical
storage, but doesn't know how to decrypt any of it.

_Unsealing_ is the process of obtaining the plaintext root key necessary to
read the decryption key to decrypt the data, allowing access to the Vault.

Prior to unsealing, almost no operations are possible with Vault. For
example authentication, managing the mount tables, etc. are all not possible.
The only possible operations are to unseal the Vault and check the status
of the seal.

## Why?

The data stored by Vault is encrypted. Vault needs the _encryption key_ in order
to decrypt the data. The encryption key is also stored with the data
(in the _keyring_), but encrypted with another encryption key known as the _root key_.

Therefore, to decrypt the data, Vault must decrypt the encryption key
which requires the root key. Unsealing is the process of getting access to
this root key. The root key is stored alongside all other Vault data,
but is encrypted by yet another mechanism: the unseal key.

To recap: most Vault data is encrypted using the encryption key in the keyring;
the keyring is encrypted by the root key; and the root key is encrypted by
the unseal key.

## Shamir seals

![Shahir seals](/img/vault-shamir-seal.png)

The default Vault config uses a Shamir seal. Instead of distributing the unseal
key as a single key to an operator, Vault uses an algorithm known as
[Shamir's Secret Sharing](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shamir%27s_Secret_Sharing)
to split the key into shares. A certain threshold of shares is required to
reconstruct the unseal key, which is then used to decrypt the root key.

This is the _unseal_ process: the shares are added one at a time (in any
order) until enough shares are present to reconstruct the key and
decrypt the root key.

## Unsealing

The unseal process is done by running `vault operator unseal` or via the API.
This process is stateful: each key can be entered via multiple mechanisms from
multiple client machines and it will work. This allows each share of the root
key to be on a distinct client machine for better security.

Note that when using the Shamir seal with multiple nodes, each node must be
unsealed with the required threshold of shares. Partial unsealing of each node
is not distributed across the cluster.

Once a Vault node is unsealed, it remains unsealed until one of these things happens:

1. It is resealed via the API (see below).

2. The server is restarted.

3. Vault's storage layer encounters an unrecoverable error.

-> **Note:** Unsealing makes the process of automating a Vault install
difficult. Automated tools can easily install, configure, and start Vault,
but unsealing it using Shamir is a very manual process. For most users
Auto Unseal will provide a better experience.

## Sealing

There is also an API to seal the Vault. This will throw away the root
key in memory and require another unseal process to restore it. Sealing
only requires a single operator with root privileges.

This way, if there is a detected intrusion, the Vault data can be locked
quickly to try to minimize damages. It can't be accessed again without
access to the root key shares.

## Auto unseal

Auto unseal was developed to aid in reducing the operational complexity of
keeping the unseal key secure. This feature delegates the responsibility of
securing the unseal key from users to a trusted device or service. At startup
Vault will connect to the device or service implementing the seal and ask it
to decrypt the root key Vault read from storage.

![Auto Unseal](/img/vault-auto-unseal.png)

There are certain operations in Vault besides unsealing that
require a quorum of users to perform, e.g. generating a root token. When
using a Shamir seal the unseal keys must be provided to authorize these
operations. When using Auto Unseal these operations require _recovery
keys_ instead.

Just as the initialization process with a Shamir seal yields unseal keys,
initializing with an Auto Unseal yields recovery keys.

It is still possible to seal a Vault node using the API. In this case Vault
will remain sealed until restarted, or the unseal API is used, which with Auto
Unseal requires the recovery key fragments instead of the unseal key fragments
that would be provided with Shamir. The process remains the same.

For a list of examples and supported providers, please see the
[seal documentation](/vault/docs/configuration/seal).

When DR replication is enabled in Vault Enterprise, [Performance Standby](/vault/docs/enterprise/performance-standby) nodes on the DR cluster will seal themselves, so they must be restarted to be unsealed.

<Warning title="Recovery keys cannot decrypt the root key">

Recovery keys cannot decrypt the root key and thus are not sufficient to unseal
Vault if the auto unseal mechanism isn't working. They are purely an authorization mechanism.
Using auto unseal creates a strict Vault lifecycle dependency on the underlying seal mechanism. 
This means that if the seal mechanism (such as the Cloud KMS key) becomes unavailable, 
or deleted before the seal is migrated, then there is no ability to recover 
access to the Vault cluster until the mechanism is available again. **If the seal 
mechanism or its keys are permanently deleted, then the Vault cluster cannot be recovered, even
from backups.**
To mitigate this risk, we recommend careful controls around management of the seal
mechanism, for example using
[AWS Service Control Policies](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/organizations/latest/userguide/orgs_manage_policies_scps.html)
or similar.
With Vault Enterprise secondary clusters (disaster or performance) can have a
seal configured independently of the primary, and when properly configured guards
against *some* of this risk.  Unreplicated items such as local mounts could still
be lost.

</Warning>

## Recovery key

When Vault is initialized while using an HSM or KMS, rather than unseal keys
being returned to the operator, recovery keys are returned. These are generated
from an internal recovery key that is split via Shamir's Secret Sharing, similar
to Vault's treatment of unseal keys when running without an HSM or KMS.

Details about initialization and rekeying follow. When performing an operation
that uses recovery keys, such as `generate-root`, selection of the recovery
keys for this purpose, rather than the barrier unseal keys, is automatic.

### Initialization

When initializing, the split is performed according to the following CLI flags
and their API equivalents in the [/sys/init](/vault/api-docs/system/init) endpoint:

- `recovery-shares`: The number of shares into which to split the recovery
  key. This value is equivalent to the `recovery_shares` value in the API
  endpoint.
- `recovery-threshold`: The threshold of shares required to reconstruct the
  recovery key. This value is equivalent to the `recovery_threshold` value in
  the API endpoint.
- `recovery-pgp-keys`: The PGP keys to use to encrypt the returned recovery
  key shares. This value is equivalent to the `recovery_pgp_keys` value in the
  API endpoint, although as with `pgp_keys` the object in the API endpoint is
  an array, not a string.

Additionally, Vault will refuse to initialize if the option has not been set to
generate a key, and no key is found. See
[Configuration](/vault/docs/configuration/seal/pkcs11) for more details.

### Rekeying

#### Unseal key

Vault's unseal key can be rekeyed using a normal `vault operator rekey`
operation from the CLI or the matching API calls. The rekey operation is
authorized by meeting the threshold of recovery keys. After rekeying, the new
barrier key is wrapped by the HSM or KMS and stored like the previous key; it is not
returned to the users that submitted their recovery keys.

<EnterpriseAlert product="vault">
  Seal wrapping requires Vault Enterprise
</EnterpriseAlert>

#### Recovery key

The recovery key can be rekeyed to change the number of shares/threshold or to
target different key holders via different PGP keys. When using the Vault CLI,
this is performed by using the `-target=recovery` flag to `vault operator rekey`.

Via the API, the rekey operation is performed with the same parameters as the
[normal `/sys/rekey`
endpoint](/vault/api-docs/system/rekey); however, the
API prefix for this operation is at `/sys/rekey-recovery-key` rather than
`/sys/rekey`.

## Seal migration

The seal migration process cannot be performed without downtime, and due to the
technical underpinnings of the seal implementations, the process requires that
you briefly take the whole cluster down. While experiencing some downtime may
be unavoidable, we believe that switching seals is a rare event and that the
inconvenience of the downtime is an acceptable trade-off.

~> **NOTE**: A backup should be taken before starting seal migration in case
something goes wrong.

~> **NOTE**: Seal migration operation will require both old and new seals to be
available during the migration. For example, migration from auto unseal to Shamir
seal will require that the service backing the auto unseal is accessible during
the migration.

~> **NOTE**: Seal migration from auto unseal to auto unseal of the same type is
supported since Vault 1.6.0. However, there is a current limitation that
prevents migrating from AWSKMS to AWSKMS; all other seal migrations of the same
type are supported. Seal migration from one auto unseal type (AWS KMS) to
different auto unseal type (HSM, Azure KMS, etc.) is also supported on older
versions as well.

### Migration post Vault 1.16.0 via Seal HA for Auto Seals (Enterprise)

With Seal HA, migration between auto-unseal types (not including any Shamir
seals) can be done fully online using Seal High Availability (Seal HA) without
any downtime.

1. Edit the Vault configuration, and add the new, target seal configuration.
1. Send the Vault process the SIGHUP signal, triggering a configuration reload.
1. Monitor the [`sys/sealwrap/rewrap`](/vault/api-docs/system/sealwrap-rewrap) endpoints,
to see that rewrap is running, and/or [`sys/seal-backend-status`](/vault/api-docs/system/seal-backend-status),
endpoints, waiting for `fully_wrapped` to be true, indicating all seal wrapped values are now
wrapped by the new seal.  The logs also contain information about the rewrap progress.
1. Edit the Vault configuration, removing the old seal configuration.
1. Send the Vault process the SIGHUP signal, again allowing re-wrapping to complete.

### Migration post Vault 1.5.1

These steps are common for seal migrations between any supported kinds and for
any storage backend.

1. Take a standby node down and update the [seal
   configuration](/vault/docs/configuration/seal).

   - If the migration is from Shamir seal to Auto seal, add the desired new Auto
     seal block to the configuration.
   - If the migration is from Auto seal to Shamir seal, add `disabled = "true"`
     to the old seal block.
   - If the migration is from Auto seal to another Auto seal, add `disabled =
     "true"` to the old seal block and add the desired new Auto seal block.

   Now, bring the standby node back up and run the unseal command on each key, by
   supplying the `-migrate` flag.

   - Supply Shamir unseal keys if the old seal was Shamir, which will be migrated
     as the recovery keys for the Auto seal.
   - Supply recovery keys if the old seal is one of Auto seals, which will be
     migrated as the recovery keys of the new Auto seal, or as Shamir unseal
     keys if the new seal is Shamir.

1. Perform step 1 for all the standby nodes, one at a time. It is necessary to
   bring back the downed standby node before moving on to the other standby nodes,
   specifically when Integrated Storage is in use for it helps to retain the
   quorum.

1. [Step down](/vault/docs/commands/operator/step-down) the
   active node. One of the standby nodes will become the new active node.
   When using Integrated Storage, ensure that quorum is reached and a leader is
   elected.

1. The new active node will perform the migration. Monitor the server log in
   the active node to witness the completion of the seal migration process.
   Wait for a little while for the migration information to replicate to all the
   nodes in case of Integrated Storage. In enterprise Vault, switching an Auto seal
   implies that the seal wrapped storage entries get re-wrapped. Monitor the log
   and wait until this process is complete (look for `seal re-wrap completed`). 

<Warning heading="Seal configuration changes will invoke rewrap">

   Any change to the `seal` stanza in your Vault configuration invokes seal-rewrap,
   even "migrations" from the same auto-unseal type like `pkcs11` to `pkcs11`.

</Warning>

1. Seal migration is now completed. Take down the old active node, update its
   configuration to use the new seal blocks (completely unaware of the old seal type)
   ,and bring it back up. It will be auto-unsealed if the new seal is one of the
   auto seals, or will require unseal keys if the new seal is Shamir.

1. At this point, configuration files of all the nodes can be updated to only have the
   new seal information. Standby nodes can be restarted right away and the active
   node can be restarted upon a leadership change.

### Migration pre 1.5.1

#### Migration from shamir to auto unseal

To migrate from Shamir keys to Auto Unseal, take your server cluster offline and
update the [seal configuration](/vault/docs/configuration/seal) with the appropriate
seal configuration. Bring your server back up and leave the rest of the nodes
offline if using multi-server mode, then run the unseal process with the
`-migrate` flag and bring the rest of the cluster online.

All unseal commands must specify the `-migrate` flag. Once the required
threshold of unseal keys are entered, unseal keys will be migrated to recovery
keys.

`$ vault operator unseal -migrate`

#### Migration from auto unseal to shamir

To migrate from auto unseal to Shamir keys, take your server cluster offline
and update the [seal configuration](/vault/docs/configuration/seal) and add `disabled
= "true"` to the seal block. This allows the migration to use this information
to decrypt the key but will not unseal Vault. When you bring your server back
up, run the unseal process with the `-migrate` flag and use the Recovery Keys
to perform the migration. All unseal commands must specify the `-migrate` flag.
Once the required threshold of recovery keys are entered, the recovery keys
will be migrated to be used as unseal keys.

#### Migration from auto unseal to auto unseal

~> **NOTE**: Migration between same Auto Unseal types is supported in Vault
1.6.0 and higher. For these pre-1.5.1 steps, it is only possible to migrate from
one type of auto unseal to a different type (ie Transit -> AWSKMS).

To migrate from auto unseal to a different auto unseal configuration, take your
server cluster offline and update the existing [seal
configuration](/vault/docs/configuration/seal) and add `disabled = "true"` to the seal
block. Then add another seal block to describe the new seal.

When you bring your server back up, run the unseal process with the `-migrate`
flag and use the Recovery Keys to perform the migration. All unseal commands
must specify the `-migrate` flag. Once the required threshold of recovery keys
are entered, the recovery keys will be kept and used as recovery keys in the new
seal.

#### Migration with integrated storage

Integrated Storage uses the Raft protocol underneath, which requires a quorum of
servers to be online before the cluster is functional. Therefore, bringing the
cluster back up one node at a time with the seal configuration updated, will not
work in this case. Follow the same steps for each kind of migration described
above with the exception that after the cluster is taken offline, update the
seal configurations of all the nodes appropriately and bring them all back up.
When the quorum of nodes are back up, Raft will elect a leader and the leader
node that will perform the migration. The migrated information will be replicated to
all other cluster peers and when the peers eventually become the leader,
migration will not happen again on the peer nodes.

## Seal high availability <EnterpriseAlert inline="true" />

Seal high availability (Seal HA) allows the configuration of more than one auto 
seal mechanism such that Vault can tolerate the temporary loss of a seal service 
or device for a time.  With Seal HA configured with at least two and no more than
three auto seals, Vault can also start up and unseal if one of the
configured seals is still available (though Vault will remain in a degraded mode in
this case). While seals are unavailable, seal wrapping and entropy augmentation can
still occur using the remaining seals, and values produced while a seal is down will
be re-wrapped with all the seals when all seals become healthy again.

An operator should choose two seals that are unlikely to become unavailable at the
same time.  For example, they may choose KMS keys in two cloud regions, from
two different providers; or a mix of HSM, KMS, or Transit seals.

When an operator configures an additional seal or removes a seal (one at a time)
and restarts Vault, Vault will automatically detect that it needs to re-wrap
CSPs and seal wrapped values, and will start the process.  Seal re-wrapping can
be monitored via the logs or via the `sys/seal-status` endpoint.  While a 
re-wrap is in progress (or could not complete successfully), changes to the
seal configuration are not allowed.

In additional to high availability, seal HA can be used to migrate between two 
auto seals in a simplified manner.  To migrate in this way:

In additional to high availability, Seal HA can be used to migrate between two
auto seals in a [simplified manner.](#migration-post-vault-1-16-0-via-seal-ha-for-auto-seals-enterprise)

Note that Shamir seals are not auto seals and cannot be included in a Seal
HA setup.  This is because auto seals support seal wrap while Shamir seals
do not, so the loss of the auto seal does not necessarily leave Vault in a
fully available state. 

### Use and Configuration

Refer to the [configuration](/vault/docs/configuration/seal/seal-ha) section
for details on configuring Seal HA.

### Seal Re-Wrapping

Whenever seal configuration changes, Vault must re-wrap all CSPs and seal
wrapped values, to ensure each value has an entry encrypted by all configured
seals.  Vault detects these configuration changes automatically, and triggers
a re-wrap.  Re-wraps can take some time, depending on the number of
seal wrapped values.  While re-wrapping is in progress, no configuration changes
to the seals can be made.

Progress of the re-wrap can be monitored using
the [`sys/sealwrap/rewrap`](/vault/api-docs/system/sealwrap-rewrap) endpoint.

### Limitations and Known Issues

In order to limit complexity and increase safety, there are some limitations
to the use and configuration of Seal HA:

* Vault must be configured for a single seal at the time of initialization.
Extra seals can then be added.
* Seals must be added or removed one at a time.
* Only auto seals can be used in HA configurations.  Shamir and auto cannot
be mixed.
* A maximum of three seals can be configured.
* As seal wrapped values must be wrapped by all configured seals, it is possible
that large values may fail to persist as the size of the entry is multiplied by
the number of seals causing it to exceed the storage entry size limit.   An example
would be storing a large document in KVv2 with seal wrapping enabled.
* It is not possible to rotate the data encryption key nor the recovery keys while
unless all seals are healthy.
