(* SKEME *)

pred c/1 decompData, elimVar.

(* Public key cryptography *)

fun pk/1.
fun encrypt/2.

(* Hash function *)

fun hash/1.

(* Diffie-Hellman *)

fun f/2.
fun g/1.
equation f(x,g(y)) = f(y,g(x)).

(* Keyed hash function *)

fun keyhash/2.

query c:secretA[].
query c:secretB[].

(* Secrecy assumptions *)

not c:skA[].
not c:x[pk(skA[])].
not c:y[(encrypt((pk(skA[]), a), pk(skA[])), b)].
not c:Ka[pk(skA[])].
not c:Kb[(encrypt((pk(skA[]),Ka[pk(skA[])]),pk(skA[])),g(x[pk(skA[])]))].

reduc

c:keyhash((g(y[(encrypt((pk(skA[]),v14),pk(skA[])),v15)]),v15,pk(skA[]),pk(skA[])),hash((v14,Kb[(encrypt((pk(skA[]),v14),pk(skA[])),v15)]))) & c:(encrypt((pk(skA[]),v14),pk(skA[])),v15) -> c:encrypt(secretB[],pk(hash(f(y[(encrypt((pk(skA[]),v14),pk(skA[])),v15)],v15))));
c:(encrypt((v9,v10),pk(skA[])),v11) -> c:(encrypt(Kb[(encrypt((v9,v10),pk(skA[])),v11)],v9),g(y[(encrypt((v9,v10),pk(skA[])),v11)]),keyhash((v11,g(y[(encrypt((v9,v10),pk(skA[])),v11)]),pk(skA[]),v9),hash((v10,Kb[(encrypt((v9,v10),pk(skA[])),v11)]))));
c:(encrypt(v8,pk(skA[])),v7,keyhash((g(x[pk(skA[])]),v7,pk(skA[]),pk(skA[])),hash((Ka[pk(skA[])],v8)))) & c:pk(skA[]) -> c:encrypt(secretA[],pk(hash(f(x[pk(skA[])],v7))));
c:(encrypt(v4,pk(skA[])),v2,keyhash((g(x[v3]),v2,v3,pk(skA[])),hash((Ka[v3],v4)))) & c:v3 -> c:keyhash((v2,g(x[v3]),pk(skA[]),v3),hash((Ka[v3],v4)));
c:v1 -> c:(encrypt((pk(skA[]),Ka[v1]),v1),g(x[v1]));
c:pk(skA[]);
c:c[];
c:encrypt(x,pk(y)) & c:y -> c:x;
c:any9 -> c:pk(any9);
c:any8 & c:any7 -> c:keyhash(any8,any7);
c:any6 & c:any5 -> c:encrypt(any6,any5);
c:any4 -> c:hash(any4);
c:any3 & c:any2 -> c:f(any3,any2);
c:any1 -> c:g(any1).


(* EXPECTPV
RESULT goal unreachable: c:secretB[]
RESULT goal unreachable: c:secretA[]
0.012s (user 0.012s + system 0.000s), max rss 8908K
END *)
