(* Check that the analysis is less precise when names do not have the
previous inputs in their parameters (only the session identifiers)

This is the corrected Needham-Schroeder protocol, and the system
fails to prove its correctness, whereas it succeeds with the previous
inputs in the parameters of nonces *)

pred begin/1 block.
pred c/1 elimVar, decompData.
nounif c:x.

fun pk/1.
fun encrypt/2.

query end:x,y.

reduc

c:encrypt(Nb[v10],pk(skB[])) & c:encrypt((v9,pk(skA[])),pk(skB[])) -> end:(v10),(v9,pk(skA[]),pk(skB[]),Nb[v10]);
c:encrypt((v6,v7),pk(skB[])) -> c:encrypt((v6,Nb[v8],pk(skB[])),v7);
begin:(Na[v4],pk(skA[]),v3,v5) & c:encrypt((Na[v4],v5,v3),pk(skA[])) & c:v3 -> c:encrypt(v5,v3);
c:v1 -> c:encrypt((Na[v2],pk(skA[])),v1);
c:pk(skB[]);
c:pk(skA[]);
c:c[];
c:encrypt(x,pk(y)) & c:y -> c:x;
c:any3 -> c:pk(any3);
c:any2 & c:any1 -> c:encrypt(any2,any1).
